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FIFTY Y E A R S OF R A C E R E L A T I O N S 
IN E A S T ST. LOUIS! T H E BREAKING 
D O W N OF W H I T E S U P R E M A C Y 
E L L I O T T M . R U D W I C K 
In 1917 at East St. Louis, Illinois, a community then popularly known 
as the "industrial offshoot of St. Louis, " the bloodiest race riot in twentieth 
century America took place. Nine whites and at least thirty-nine Negroes 
were killed. The whites were determined to maintain supremacy in a com-
munity where Negroes were a subordinate and segregated group. For more 
than a generation after 1917, the race riot was used as a cautionary tale to 
keep Negroes from altering the status quo. Not until after the Second World 
War did Negroes feel free to consider challenging white dominance. 
In violation of state laws, in 1917 East St. Louis Negroes were ex-
cluded from restaurants, theaters and hotels, and were educated in sepa-
rate schools. Both the AFL and the large industrial corporations excluded 
Negroes from skilled jobs. In the big factories unskilled colored employ-
ees used separate washrooms and dressing rooms, usually worked in seg-
regated labor gangs and ate in the colored section of the lunchrooms. Most 
Negroes resigned themselves to accepting the status quo, and the few who 
agitated for racial equality were condemned by local whites who charged 
them with preaching discontent to the res t of the colored residents. One 
militant Negro, who was labeled "an aggressive political agitator, " was 
falsely convicted of starting the 1917 race riot and sentenced to life im-
prisonment. * 
The background of the East St. Louis racial conflagration was laid in 
the migration of several thousand Negroes who arrived from the South be -
tween 1915 and 1917 to work in the factories. At the time of America 's 
entry into World War I, Negroes constituted approximately 13, 000 out of a 
total population estimated at 70, 000. Negroes were accused of taking the 
jobs of the whites, and unskilled white workers charged that the plant man-
agers had imported the Negroes in order to depress the wage scale and 
prevent unionization. Actually there was no evidence of widespread 
"importation" by East St. Louis corporations. Negroes left the south be -
cause their economic conditions were poor in comparison with the opportu-
nities available in the job market of the North which had expanded because 
of the European war. 
Factory laborers attempted to improve their working conditions by 
forming unions, but the employers refused to recognize them. In some 
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instances unions were crushed by the employment of Negro strikebreakers, 
and in other cases white union sympathizers were fired and replaced by 
Negro migrants. The white workers hated the Negroes because manage-
ment used them as a labor reservoir , and played off one race against the 
other. And the insecure whites who regarded the Negroes as a threat exag-
gerated the size of the migration. In the weeks before the riot, the fears of 
the white workers were exacerbated by the local newspaper, which repeat-
edly published false stories about thousands of Negroes who were arriving 
monthly, not only to take white men's jobs, but also to commit crimes 
against the white population. 
Negroes in East St. Louis were resented for political as well as eco-
nomic reasons. In 1916-17, Negroes, who comprised about 15% of the total 
population, held the balance of power in closely contested elections. Form-
ing political clubs and demanding recognition in the forms of jobs and sta-
tus, they angered many citizens who were not used to Negroes exercising 
their constitutional rights. White politicians, when their own purposes 
were served, showed no reluctance in using inflammatory race prejudice. 
For example, several months before the riot, during the 1916 presidential 
campaign, East St. Louis Democratic leaders falsely accused Negroes of 
conspiring to "colonize" in the city in large numbers, a charge which the 
union organizers later modified slightly in unfurling the banner against im-
portation. 
East St. Louis Democrats, in their propaganda against the mythical 
colonization conspiracy, said that white Republicans illegally brought 
Negroes to East St. Louis from the South for the purpose of defeating 
Woodrow Wilson in his bid for reelection. Since the Democrats placed Ill i-
nois in the "very doubtful" column, they hoped that the attack against col-
onization would not only insure a large turnout of supporters at the polls, 
but, in addition, intimidate Negro Republicans from casting ballots. The 
local newspaper, which supported the Democrats, obligingly filled its col-
umns almost daily with stories about Negro migrants who were descending 
upon the city to undermine the very foundations of the American democratic 
process by stealing an election from the people. 
Thus, in the months before July 1917, an uneasy and hostile white 
population was st i rred up by the irresponsible actions of the local newspa-
per, the factory managers, labor organizers and politicians. There is no 
evidence that the riot was premeditated, but shortly before it broke out, 
laboring men gathered to find ways of "getting rid of" the Negroes. Almost 
nightly, white gangs made unprovoked attacks upon colored men and.even 
women. On the night of July 1, 1917, a group of whites in a Ford car shot 
up a Negro neighborhood, and shortly afterwards, when a Ford police car 
entered an unlighted Negro section, residents fired upon it. That action, 
which was almost certainly a case of mistaken identity, resulted in the 
deaths of two white law enforcement officers and triggered the holocaust the 
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following morning.^ At least 39 Negroes, some of whom were merely 
passing through the town on their way to St. Louis, paid with their lives. 
Over the next three decades, the memory of that race riot was 
undimmed and was used to keep Negroes in line. In 1940, for example, a 
local Negro lawyer, testifying before an Illinois legislative committee, r e -
ported that although the state public accommodations law was still flouted 
in East St. Louis, Negroes contemplating civil rights suits were warned by 
white residents — and even by some Negroes — that legal action could 
trigger another race riot. 3 
Several years later, a Negro organization composed of teenagers 
wanted to have a picnic at a public park with white youngsters from several 
clubs, but the recreation agency which sponsored the groups vetoed the idea 
because it might start another race riot. 4 When East St. Louisans debated 
the question of school integration in 1949, some opponents declared that the 
residue of prejudice from the first race riot might create a second one if 
the schools were desegregated. During the time that Negro youngsters 
were staging a sit-in at a white school, the local newspaper editorialized:5 
All of the ingredients for a recurrence of the 1917 race 
riot are simmering now, heated by the fire of race p r e j -
udice that has kept smouldering for these many years in 
the darkness of suspicion and fear. All that it takes is 
one overt act and the flames will envelop us . That must 
not happen . . . . Ever since 1917, East St. Louis nursed 
a taboo of its own. The horrid words "race riot" have 
been the fetish that we have kept in the gloom of the medi-
cine man's tent to be whispered about and never brought 
out into the open except when we wished to strike fear in 
the hearts of the people. It is time now for East St. Louis 
to face the facts of life and to bring this hobgoblin out 
into the open for all to see and talk about and understand. 
That is the only way we can work out a cure for the 
malignancy that has gnawed at our social, economic and 
political vitals for more than 30 years . 
However, the newspaper's idea of facing the facts was to uphold the doc-
trine of white supremacy and blame the school sit-in on Communist sympa-
thizers. 
Fourteen years after this editorial, East St. Louis was rocked and 
shaken in 1963 by a series of racial demonstrations against banks, stores 
and even the City Hall. 6 Especially because some of the methods used by 
the militant Negroes directly interfered with the operation of businesses 
and almost certainly involved violations of criminal t respass laws, many 
white East St. Louisans angrily charged that Negroes, rather than wanting 
equal rights, were actually insisting on superior rights. As usual there 
were predictions of another race riot, but the warning no longer struck fear 
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in the hearts of Negroes. Most whites were totally unaware of the griev-
ances of Negroes, and of their growing efforts, since the school sit-in of 
1949, to protest against the injustice of discrimination. Most of these 
efforts had been ignored, and even when concessions came they were f re-
quently merely symbolic. 
Thus the school sit-in of 1949, to which we have already referred, 
appeared to have resulted in a clearcut victory, but in practice this victory 
was emasculated by use of various devices. This sit-in, sponsored by the 
local branch of the NAACP, was the first time that East St. Louis Negroes 
used direct action to oppose race discrimination. It lasted only two days 
and was called off when white students engaged in a protest strike, which 
might, NAACP leaders feared, trigger racial violence. The Negro protest 
followed years of concern about the inferior equipment and facilities in 
their separate school system. Negroes had also complained about c lass -
room overcrowding, which was especially acute at Lincoln High. To handle 
the overflow at that school, the auditorium, study hall, library and music 
room all were converted into classrooms. The Board of Education had 
agreed to build a new Negro secondary institution, but the money earmarked 
for the school was so inadequate that the Board late in 1948 decided to elim-
inate such "frills" as an auditorium, band room and other rooms for spe-
cialized activities. A Negro delegation was told that classrooms were more 
essential than music rooms, and that the group should be grateful for the 
new high school. 7 
At the start, the Negroes' complaint was essentially against unequal 
facilities, not against the segregated system per se. For years the sepa-
rate school system had been condoned by Negroes on the grounds that it 
provided many jobs for colored school teachers. 8 Consequently the first 
reaction after the Board of Education's rebuff was to request a larger 
Negro high school and the right to send the overflow of Negro secondary 
students to the white high school in the city. However, the national head-
quarters of the NAACP strongly urged the branch not to be satisfied with a 
segregated educational system which would always have unequal facilities. 
The Association favored strict compliance with an 1874 Illinois statute out-
lawing segregated school systems. The local branch, encouraged by the 
national office, and angered by the Board of Education's undiplomatic t rea t -
ment, sponsored a mass meeting that drew such an overflow crowd, that 
one Negro observer noted, "One would think there was a revolution in the 
making. " 1 0 A young Negro attorney suggested that a court test should be 
instituted and the sit-in resulted a few weeks later. *-*-
While the local branch's case was in the courts, the national head-
quarters of the NAACP obtained support from Illinois Rep. Charles J. Jen-
kins, a Negro Republican from Chicago, who proposed an amendment to the 
Illinois school appropriations bill which would bar state financial aid from 
schools practicing racial segregation. In 1949, the East St. Louis share of 
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these Illinois grants amounted to between $600, 000 and $700, 000 — some of 
which had already been spent in anticipation of receiving the funds. 12 The 
East St. Louis NAACP attorney announced that on the basis of the Jenkins 
amendment an injunction would be filed to prevent the allocation of state 
educational funds for East St. Louis. He also said that he intended to prove 
the existence of racial segregation by attempting to register Negro students 
at neighborhood schools when they opened for the September 1949 t e r m . 1 3 
Almost immediately the local School Board appointed a blue-ribbon 
citizens' committee to work out an agreement with NAACP leaders. In ex-
change for the NAACP pledge not to enroll Negro children in white schools 
when they opened that fall, the School Board promised to help educate the 
community to accept integration peacefully. While no date for integration 
was announced, Negroes understood that in the following semester some of 
their youngsters would leave their old schools, and that desegregation would 
proceed as rapidly as practicable. Since Lincoln High had started the 
branch's protest, references to that institution were featured prominently 
in the board's agreement. Lincoln was to have its auditorium and band 
room, and its students were to be offered the same subjects as taught at 
the white East St. Louis Senior High and in classes of comparable size. -^ 
Despite this agreement, the Board of Education used various means 
to maintain racial separation and inequalities in the elementary and second-
ary institutions. In racially mixed residential areas , the Board established 
a "boundary of convenience" for white children, providing them until about 
1960 with bus transportation to circumvent the neighborhood school concept. 
For most Negro youngsters the boundary lines were rigidly enforced, and 
during this period when school funds were expended to transport whites 
away from neighborhood schools, some Negroes were required to walk as 
much as two miles to their neighborhood schools. Negro parents making "a 
big enoughfuss" or having political connections could, if willingto pay t r ans -
portation costs, send their children to distant integrated institutions. -1-5 
The handling of graduates of Alta Sita elementary school illustrates 
the School Board's continued practice of assigning students on a racial 
basis . In 1950 Alta Sita had been integrated despite rumors that the build-
ing would be burned down it Negroes en tered . 1 6 From 1950 to 1963 the 
Board assigned white students graduating from this school to the almost 
exclusively white Clark Junior High School, from which they went on to the 
predominantly white East St. Louis Senior High. Negro graduates of Alta 
Sita, on the other hand, were routinely assigned first to all-Negro Hughes-
Quinn Junior High and then to all-Negro Lincoln High School.1 7 Because 
Lincoln's boundary lines were vague and unpublicized, some Negroes 
attended that institution although their home addresses actually entitled 
them to enrollment at East St. Louis Senior High. White students living 
nearer to Lincoln than to East St. Louis Senior High attended the latter in-
stitution even, as in one recorded instance, when an application was made 
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to Lincoln. i y Regardless of the School BoardTs agreement, inequalities 
continued between the all-Negro Lincoln and the predominantly white East 
St. Louis Senior High in such important matters as class size, equipment 
and curriculum. For example, among the vocational courses taught at East 
St. Louis Senior High but omitted at Lincoln were auto mechanics, electric-
ity and machine calculations.1 9 Not until 1962-63 were Lincoln students, 
at their own financial expense, routinely permitted a transfer to East St. 
Louis High if the courses they wanted were unavailable at Lincoln. 
The education case has been described in detail because it shows that 
even at a time when the Negroes constituted 40 to 45% of the cityTs popula-
tion, the white citizens controlled social institutions primarily for their own 
benefit. During the 1950!s the NAACP sent delegations to protest against 
educational inequality, but they were ignored. 20 Paradoxically, the Negro 
bloc vote, controlled by a white-dominated political structure, was largely 
responsible for maintaining the Board in office. * 
Since Negro mass action had been so effective in accelerating the 
original integration drive, why wasnTt this strategy used to pressure the 
School Board into equalizing the school system? In the first place, because 
token desegregation had occurred and some Negroes were attending schools 
with whites, the symbolic victory clouded the issues and blunted any mass 
protest. Secondly, some of the anger of Negroes (especially those in the 
middle classes) was drained off because through contact with influential 
channels, they could withdraw their children from inferior segregated 
neighborhood schools and send them to integrated institutions. Thirdly, the 
local NAACP branch was not geared for mass direct action and used it only 
in a crisis situation. Only about fifteen persons regularly attended monthly 
meetings, and these people lacked the time and enormous energy required 
to mobilize the Negro masses in another school fight. Thus, despite the 
dramatic Negro school integration victory of 1949-50, East St. Louis whites 
still continued to run the schools essentially for their own interests . 
Negro protest and direct action methods had won little in the schools, 
but the use of other techniques against economic discrimination during the 
1950's obtained even less . Negroes signed petition after petition, sent 
countless delegations to City Council and held innumerable meetings to 
improve their status. But nobody paid much attention. Most stores which 
Negroes patronized in downtown East St. Louis still used only white sa les-
men, corporations continued to bar Negroes from white collar jobs, most 
craft unions maintained their "white only" policies and even the common 
laborers local practiced race exclusion.22 
In 1954 an NAACP delegation addressed the City Council, requesting 
the passage of a local Fair Employment Practices Ordinance. The NAACP 
petition was merely referred to the Mayor's Human Relations Commis-
sion. 2 3 This Commission had been formed in 1950 to prevent racial con-
flicts, but meetings were held sporadically and little was accomplished 
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except the integration of a theater and a hotel. The Commission ignored 
the 1954 request for an FEPC, and five years later, Negroes were still 
unsuccessfully seeking the ordinance in conferences with the City Coun-
c i l . 2 4 
During the 1950's the East St. Louis City Council was also asked to 
help end job discrimination in the public utilities by threatening these cor -
porations with revocation of franchises. In the middle of the decade, not a 
single Negro was employed by the City Bus Lines, the Southwestern Bell 
Telephone Company or the Illinois Power Company. Although three Negroes 
were working at Union Electric and seventeen at the East St. Louis and 
Interurban Water Company, all held "scrub bucket and cuspidor j o b s . " 2 5 
One Negro group, the City-Wide Women's Civic Club, sponsored a rally 
"to heat this town so hot the City Council will have to take action, M but not 
a single white politician attended. A Negro speaker bitterly reminded the 
audience that only before elections did the white politicians go into Negro 
neighborhoods to proclaim their devotion for the colored race . In 1956, 
after years of negotiating with the bus company, the fruits of victory con-
sisted of two openings for Negro bus drivers. 26 The long negotiations with 
the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company finally produced two white collar 
positions for Negroes in 1958.2? 
Even more galling was the fact that almost no Negroes were employed 
in skilled jobs on a federally financed multi-million dollar public housing 
project begun in 1958 in the Negro neighborhood. When, in the early part 
of the year, a delegation asked the City Council to help Negroes obtain jobs 
at the development, the Negroes were told to join unions so that building 
contractors would hire them. After the delegation described the extent of 
discrimination in the building trades unions, the councilmen "promised to 
investigate. " Over the course of the next two years the NAACP held meet-
ings with the East St. Louis Housing Authority, the Greater East St. Louis 
Central Labor Council and the Federal Committee on Government Contracts 
— all without ava i l . 2 8 
In only one area had Negro protest activity obtained any significant 
success during the late 1950's and that was in public accommodations. Dur-
ing 1959 and the first half of 1960 a persistent CORE chapter, through 
"negotiation and a little talking, " had succeeded in reducing the number of 
restaurants which violated the state public accommodations law from 58 to 
a hard core of 17. 
Because petitions, negotiations, political pressure and mass rallies 
had not proven very effective as strategies, some Negroes counselled boy-
cotts and picketing, but they were ignored largely because there seemed to 
be a basic desire to preserve "good public relations" with influential whites. 
However, in 1960 the Southern lunch counter sit-ins served as a stimulus 
to East St. Louis Negroes, increasingly impatient with their deteriorated 
10 Midcontinent American Studies Journal 
economic position and the continued refusal of a group of restaurants to 
obey a law that had been*on the statute books since 1885. 
The first use of direct action in 1960 came during the summer, and in 
view of what was happening in the South, not surprisingly involved restau-
rant discrimination. Since the state 's attorney and the courts had shown 
little interest in enforcing the Illinois public accommodations law, East St. 
Louis CORE'S first step was to picket the county courthouse, seeking to 
pressure judges to appoint a special prosecuting attorney. Although the 
judges were not sympathetic, the Negroes were drawing attention to the fact 
that many restaurants were violating the law. CORE'S tactics then shifted 
to sit-in demonstrations, and after one of these resulted in the a r res t of 
Negroes for "disturbing the peace, " an angry Negro leadership persuaded 
the mayor of East St. Louis to intervene on behalf of Negro r igh t s . 2 9 
After CORE had desegregated the eating places, the chapter turned to 
bowling alleys, and here the same pattern of events emerged: the reluc-
tance of public officials to do anything about discriminatory proprietors, 
the mass picketing of city hall to embarrass the mayor and city council, and 
finally the mayor's ultimatum in the summer of 1961: integration or revo-
cation of business licenses. The local newspaper fully supported his posi-
tion: "This is the plain requirement of the law. It is also a matter of jus-
tice. It is unfair for white people to criticize the conduct of Negroes, on 
the one hand, and on the other to deny them the facilities for normal r e c r e -
ation." 
Meanwhile, the NAACP had picketed the construction site of the pub-
lic housing project. At that time NAACP officials counted only 33 Negro 
workmen out of more than 1, 000 employees working on the project, and the 
picketing began. After two weeks of demonstrations, housing authority offi-
cials were anxious for a settlement. The NAACP protest ended after the 
30 Negro labor force on the project had almost doubled. 
Negroes had now won the right to use places of public accommodation 
and recreation, and had secured a modest but significant victory on the em-
ployment front. But as far as the daily lives of most Negro East St. Louis-
ans was concerned, it soon became painfully evident that the victory had a 
hollow ring. A Southern Illinois University survey indicated that in 1963 
one-third of the Negroes in the city's labor force were unemployed as con-
trasted to ten percent of the whites. The median household income of the 
Negroes was slightly less than half of the whites': approximately $5,125 to 
$2, 500. 3 1 To some extent the economic plight was due to automation and 
the exodus of several large industrial corporations, but labor union dis-
crimination was only too evident. 
Negro leaders adopted a moderate approach at first. When Illinois 
had passed a state FEPC law in 1961, one NAACP leader noted: "We are 
told not to push but to wait for orderly change. We wait and the welfare 
rolls grow bigger. The Fair Employment Practices Commission must 
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achieve success on a voluntary basis . <** We accept this as a challenge to 
sit down in good faith and work out the necessary changes. " The NAACP 
complained that skilled Negroes were discouraged from settling in East St. 
Louis: "We want to attract the skilled Negro worker to create a healthy 
atmosphere. Instead we attract the unskilled workers who become wards 
of the community."3 3 East St. Louisans were reminded that only the fail-
ure of negotiation had spawned the direct action approach such as the 
NAACP picketing and the sit —ins of CORE. However, union officials replied 
that since they had not imposed race bar r ie rs against Negroes, the Illinois 
FEPC law would have no effect on the labor organizations. 
Nor were the Negroes successful in 1962 negotiations with the local 
corporations such as the public utilities and the banks. Efforts to obtain 
white collar positions in ten companies resulted in six jobs. For example, 
the Illinois Power Company until 1962 had never employed a Negro in more 
than a half century of operation. After a year of negotiation, two Negroes 
were hired. But when one of these left to accept a better position e lse-
where, a white person was employed as the replacement . 3 4 
Just as the Southern studentsT lunch counter si t- ins influenced East 
St. Louis civil rights activity, so in 1963 Birmingham became the inspira-
tion. In the spring of 1963 an East St. Louis Negro weekly observed that 
"the surge of civil rights is mighty contagious. It 's going to spread unless 
justice is given. East St. Louis whites should learn something from what 
is taking place in Birmingham."3 5 
About this time the East St. Louis civil rights movement received 
help from an influential Negro politician who attacked the dominant political 
structure with which he had previously been allied. Frustrated because the 
organization refused to support his candidacy for a judicial post, he ran as 
an independent in the spring municipal election. After his defeat several 
followers were discharged from their city jobs, and in protest he announced 
a march on City Hall. In this venture he associated himself with civil 
rights leaders who welcomed his assistance. The march on City Hall was 
a mass protest against a broad range of grievances. It strengthened CORE 
and the NAACP, and in turn, the increased militancy of the civil rights 
movement brought about more Negro political power in East St. Louis. 
Even before the march on City Hall, CORE had set up a picket line 
against the Illinois Power Company and the NAACP initiated direct action 
against a local beer distributing company.3 6 With renewed activity of the 
civil rights groups and the impending march — all played against a back-
drop of the national civil rights cr is is — the East St. Louis City adminis-
tration acted to satisfy at least some of the more obvious Negro demands. 
In June the mayor announced that companies receiving municipal contracts 
would be required to hire Negroes. In early July the City Council passed 
an FEPC ordinance covering municipal employees as weU as contractors 
performing work for the city. A reactivated Municipal Human Relations 
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Commission declared that a meeting with private employers would be 
scheduled and that businessmen would be asked to supply racial employment 
statistics as well as notices of future job openings. 
Despite these concessions, or perhaps because of them, the march on 
City Hall was held, after being endorsed by CORE and the NAACP. A sur -
vey by the Human Relations Commission confirmed that Negroes were s e r -
iously under-represented in skilled, supervisory and white collar positions 
at City Hall. With unusual celerity, the mayor hired several Negro sec re -
taries, upgraded other employees, and appointed Negroes to prestigious 
positions on the previously all-white Urban Renewal Advisory Committee 
and the Board of Police and Fire Commissioners. 3? 
In the wake of the march on City Hall, the NAACP and CORE 
embarked upon a series of racial demonstrations against stores and banks, 
which seemingly violated the Illinois trespass laws. The doors of a soft 
drink plant were blockaded, preventing drivers in loaded trucks from leav-
ing the garage. A Ttbuy-inM was conducted in a supermarket. Grocery carts 
were filled with unwanted merchandise and left in the aisles. Demonstra-
tors made small purchases of candy in order to slow up the lines of cus-
tomers in front of cash regis ters . The Negroes entered a bank, locked 
hands together, preventing bank customers from transacting business. 
These militant tactics led to a r res t s , but the political repercussions of 
jailing the Negroes were too great for the mayor to consider seriously. 
Furthermore, the demonstrations, which some whites referred to as race 
riots, created a build-up of tension, and there was fear that the detention 
of the demonstrators would result in possible violence. At one point during 
the demonstrations more than a hundred Illinois state troopers were ordered 
into East St. Lou i s . 3 8 These tactics of Negroes were obviously extreme, 
but they succeeded like nothing had ever done before in awakening white 
community leaders to the problem of job discrimination. For example, 
before the summer of 1963 only one Negro held a clerical job in the city's 
nine financial institutions. The racial demonstrations resulted in an agree-
ment giving twenty positions to Negroes. 
Thus in the nearly half century since the race riot of 1917, there has 
been almost a complete reversal in the dynamics of race relations in East 
St. Louis. Today Negroes are no longer on the defensive against an oppres-
sive white majority, but are militantly taking the initiative. Necessity no 
longer demands that they adjust to the desires of racist whites, and they are 
aggressively working to secure their rights as citizens. In fact it is now 
the whites who are on the defensive. The changes that have occurred in 
East St. Louis since the bloody holocaust of 1917 are of course representa-
tive of the changes in race relations taking place in American society gen-
erally. Certainly the willingness of today's East St. Louis officials and 
businessmen to accede to many of the Negro's demands is based upon the 
fact that their counterparts elsewhere have been doing the same thing. 
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Undoubtedly another factor of importance in the East St. Louis equation has 
been the growing size of the Negro population — from 15% of the eityTs peo-
ple in 1917 to about 55% today — and the potential power of the Negro vote 
that this population increase implies. 
But the power of the Negro vote proved practically negligible as a 
lever for social change until the r i se of mass action in the I960's. Involved 
in this development were two major i tems. F i rs t there was the shift in the 
pattern of protest from petitioning city officials and working through the 
courts, to direct action in the form of boycotts, picketing and sit- ins, much 
of it highly dramatic, embarrassing to the city, and inconvenient to its bus-
inessmen and officials, and some of it probably illegal. Secondly, there 
was a new mood of militance and group solidarity. As the,teen-age p res i -
dent of the East St. Louis NAACP Youth Council solemnly told his organi-
zation in the spring of 1963: "We should not fear the white man, we should 
let him know that when something happens to one of us, it affects us as a 
whole. "39 This new mood among East St. Louis Negroes was of course a 
reflection of the new attitudes of Negroes throughout the country. 
Those whites who criticized the extremism and illegality of the recent 
demonstrations did not realize that the more traditional approaches had 
failed — that the only significant concession Negroes had gained in East St. 
Louis prior to 1960 was the Board of Education's agreement to desegregate 
the schools following the NAACP sit-in in 1949. The School Board was able 
to renege on the promises it made on that occasion, just because continued 
direct-action activity did not prove feasible. It is perhaps unfortunate, but 
nonetheless true, that the power coming from mass pressure of this sort is 
the only thing political officials ever really listened to. 
Despite the anxieties of some whites who, placed on the defensive by 
the new Negro militancy, warned about the possibilities of violence in a 
city where the events of 1917 were still vividly remembered, a race riot 
did not occur in 1963 and is unlikely in the future. However, if racial vio-
lence were to erupt, in the context of conditions today, it is probably more 
likely to come from Negroes than from whites. As the distinguished Swed-
ish social scientist and authority on American race relations, Gunnar Myr-
dall, said in a recent address: "Mass Negro violence will only come . . . 
when it appears to be clear that none of the rational alternatives — demon-
strations or court decisions or politics — are making basic enough changes 
in the way most Negroes live. M Thus, it is precisely the nonviolent dem-
onstrations which prevent the possibility of race r iots . They inconvenience 
and embarrass white citizens, they may at times be "illegal," but they com-
pel the white decision-makers to redress at least some grievances of Ne-
groes and therefore lessen the chance of racial violence. 
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